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CEO remuneration is always a headline issue.
 
ZOLTAN MATOLCSY and ANNA WRIGHT go beyond the
 
headlines to ~etermine the relationship between CEO
 
remuneration and the economic characteristics of the firm.
 
The level of CEO compensation and the link between CEO compensation and firm per­formance has been extensively 
questioned by investors, politicians and 
the media in recent times. Much of the 
debate concentrates on the levels of 
compensation awarded to the CEO, and 
expresses cynicism in whether the level 
of CEO compensation is related to 
increases in firm performance. 
For example, Allan Fels wrote in 
The Australian Financial Review, "CEO 
compensation levels are growing at 
a rate out of step with the value 
they are actually providing to their 
employers, the shareholders. Millions 
of dollars of shareholders' funds are 
being wasted". 1 
However, such opinion pieces provide 
little or no evidence to support their 
arguments, but despite this, there has 
been very little investigation by the 
academic community into the 
determinants of the levels of Australian 
CEO compensation, with only limited 
evidence provided by Chalmers, Koh 
and Stapledon (2006) and Coulton and 
Taylor (2002). 
The objective of this study is to 
provide the first detailed evidence 
on the relation between firm 
characteristics and the levels of 
Australian CEO compensation. Thus 
this study provides regulators and 
investors with information that 
could assist with their respective 
legislative and investment decisions. 
The evidence presented in this study 
is based on a sample of large Australian 
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firms for the period 1999 to 2001, a 
total of 696 firm years. All accounting 
and compensation related data are 
available from the "UTS-Accenture Who 
Governs Australia" Database, while 
stock price information is collected 
from SIRCA.2 
Our key findings indicate that rather 
than being randomly decided, levels of 
Australian CEO compensation are 
associated with underlying economic 
characteristics of the firms - around 
41.5% of the total level of CEO 
compensation can be explained by 
firm characteristics. 
Specifically, the results indicate that 
the level of CEO compensation is 
positively related to firm size, firm 
complexity and current market 
performance, which is consistent 
with the theory of the determinants of 
CEO compensation.3 Thus this study 
makes a significant contribution to 
the current debate on Australian CEO 
compensation levels as it provides 
evidence that levels of compensation 
are related to the underlying economic 
characteristics of firms. 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
that the level of CEO compensation is 
set to minimise agency costs and 
maximise firm value. Following this 
traditional agency perspective, Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker (1999) state 
that shareholders choose a CEO 
compensation contract in order to 
maximise firm value based on the firm's 
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information environment, and its demand for quality in 
the CEO. 
They argue that if there is optimal CEO contracting, 
the economic determinants of the levels of CEO 
compensation would describe all of the cross-sectional 
variation in CEO compensation observed. Further, they 
suggest that the economic determinants that drive the 
level of CEO compensation are those that determine 
the level of quality required in the CEO, and the relative 
quality of the CEO, in turn, determines the level of 
compensation, with higher quality CEOs demanding 
higher compensation. 
In identifying the firm characteristics that drive the level 
of quality required in the CEO, Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) cite Rosen (1982) and Smith and Watts 
(1992), who predict that larger firms, firms with more 
growth opportunities and firms with more complex 
operations demand higher quality CEOs and therefore 
pay higher compensation. 
Past firm performance is also suggested to determine 
the level of CEO compensation, as Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Hermalin and 
Wallace (2001) argue that future salaries increase in response 
to good firm performance. Firm risk is also included as a 
determinant of CEO compensation, following the arguments 
of Banker and Datar (1989) that compensation risk (and thus 
the level of compensation) could either increase or decrease 
with firm risk. 
Consequently, Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) predict 
that larger firms, firms with more growth opportunities and 
firms with more complex operations and better past 
performance demand higher quality CEOs and therefore 
pay higher compensation. 
However, although firm characteristics could drive the 
optimal compensation contract choice, optimal contracting 
might not be observed within all firms at all times. Core, 
Guay and Larcker (2003) argue that optimal compensation 
contracting arrangements evolve over time as firms 
experiment with new types of incentive contracts and update 
their beliefs about optimal incentive levels, although they 
could still be uncertain as to the efficient contract.4 Milgrom 
and Roberts (1992) also state that in compensation 
contracting, people learn over time, and organisations adapt 
by experimentation and imitation. 
This study adopts the traditional agency perspective, 
;::! and expects that on average, the levels of CEO compensation 
~ are set based on the underlying economic characteristics 
~ of the firm that determine the relative demand for quality 
~.
'--:
c in the CEO. Thus it is predicted that the level of CEO 
. ~ compensation is related to the underlying economic 
';: characteristics of the firm that determine the relative 
I:::J demand for quality in the CEO. 
,: ro 
SAMPLE SElECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The sample is drawn from those firms contained in the 
"UTS-Accenture Who Governs Australia" Database. The 
:\1 sample selection process for inclusion in the database starts
 
',;: with all firms included in the "Top 500" Australian firmss
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(by market capitalisation) for the years 1999, 2000, and 
2001. Deleted from the sample are investment trusts and 
managed funds, which are subject to different governance 
and reporting requirements. Also deleted from the sample are 
firms reporting in foreign currency, firms where management 
were paid by another company, firms with missing data6, and 
firms listed during the year. 
Firms are also deleted from the sample where two years of 
prior data was not available, as at least two years of data is 
needed for the ex ante return variables. Finally, firms that 
changed their CEO during the year are excluded for that year 
only, as the outgoing CEO's compensation typically includes 
some type of separation payment which is not separately 
reported, while the incoming CEO typically receives some 
type of signing bonus, again not separately reported (Coulton 
and Taylor 2002). The final sample comprised 227 firms for 
1999, 224 firms for 2000 and 245 firms for 2001. Table 1 
summarises the sample selection procedure. 
TABLE 1 SAMPLE SElECTION
 
1999 2000 2001
t.:.­ - k . Total,', )"'~ 
Original sample 1,530513 510 507 
Reason for deletion: 
Investment trusts and managed funds 
Missing data 
Management paid by another firm 
Foreign currency 
Listed during year 
Prior 2 years of data not available 
CEO change 
77 69 55 201 
10 12 20 42 
12 14 13 39 
22 25 20 67 
1 23 30 54 
139 93 70 302 
25 50 54 129 
Final sample7 227 224 245 696 
All CEO compensation and firm accounting data is 
obtained from the "UTS-Accenture Who Governs Australia" 
Database. Total CEO compensation is measured using the 
bonus paid in the year following (instead of the bonus paid 
in the current year) in order to control for the lagged nature 
of bonuses.s Options granted in the year are valued using the 
Black-Scholes formula, with adjustment for diVidends. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
As discussed earlier, it is predicted that larger firms, firms 
with more growth opportunities and firms with more 
complex operations will demand higher quality CEOs and 
therefore pay higher compensation. This study proxies for 
firm size with the log of the market value of equity, growth 
opportunities with the market to book ratio and firm 
complexity with the log of total subsidiaries and the log of 
total foreign subsidiaries. 
Also included as possible determinants are past firm 
performance, measured using both market returns (adjusted 
for diVidends) and return on assets (ROA); firm risk, measured 
as the standard deviation of return on assets over the prior 
three years; and two measures of current performance - ROA 
and market return (adjusted for diVidends). 
As these firm characteristics are expected to determine the 
firm's relative demand for a certain level of quality in their 





CEO and consequently the level of compensation at the 
beginning rather than at the end of the financial period, 
these factors are ex ante predictors of the level of the 
compensation. 
Consequently, all economic characteristics are measured 
during the year prior to that in which the level of 
compensation is measured, except for current performance. 
The summary of the definitions and measurements of the 
variables used to proxy for the firm's economic characteristics 
are described in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRM THAT 
ARE PREDICTED TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF 
CEO COMPENSATION 
~v;jiil'ble - Predicted Variable na~e P;OXY--~~;d!li
'?IP;;; \ -, ~ ~, ~ sign"',' ~¥ Xw ~:", "j~ ~~~~-{!:.~ :"\' ::"Yir;~" ~~1;~.x >;~",~,m."h,",~h J""iM:>'~/ o",?J~""""~"",,,*-,,_{, ""-~~l(itM<.a~c;it~~*",~""*~¥I~l@:~-%M{* 
Log of the market 





Prior year share 
return, dividend 
adjusted 
PerfSR 1- I+ 
Prior year return on 
assets (ROA), 
measured as EBIT 
divided by the 
average book value 
of assets 
Growth opportunities 






of ROA over prior 3 
years 
Complexity 
+/­ Risk I-x 
Log of number of 
subsidiaries 
Complexsub 1- I+ 
Log of number of 
foreign subsidiaries 
Current performance 
Complexsubfor I 1 + 




Current year return 
on assets (ROA), 
measured as EBIT 
divided by the 
average book value 
of assets 
CurrPerfROA I+ 
In order to test the relation between the levels of CEO 
compensation and the predicted firm characteristics, we 
estimate the following cross-sectional regression: 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Table 3 shows the overall sample distributions of the firm 
characteristics identified as being relevant to the level of CEO 
compensation for the sample. Due to missing data, the 
overall sample is reduced to 672 observations, and 601 
observations for the risk variable.9 
n Mean Median Std dev
 
TotalCompit
 13,215 13,122 1,006
 
TotalCompit - unlogged $
 
672 
672 939,677 499,910 1,272,805 
Size l_1 18,97219,306 1,670
 
Size l_1 - unlogged $
 
672 









,313 ,023 1,35672 
,0234672 199056 
3148 1762672 5223 
,0603 ,0211 ,114601 
3,51672 1847 2602 
672 -2,275 6932 5.477 
672 1514 070 530 









Complexsubfor I I 
CurrPerfSR t 
CurrPerfROA t 
Log of total compensation using lagged bonuses and 
valuing options using Black-Scholes 
Log of the market value of equity 
Prior year share return 
Prior year Return on Assets (ROA) 
Market-to-book ratio 
Standard deviation of ROA over prior 3 years 
Log of number of subsidiaries 
Log of number of foreign subsidiaries 
Current year share return 
Current year ROA 
Table 3 shows that during our sample period, the average 
total CEO compensation is $939,677, and average firm size 
(lagged) is $1,445,975,993. Table 4 (overleaf) provides the 
results for the regression analysis of levels of compensation 
on the economic characteristics of the firm. 
TotalCompit = 170 + 171Sizeit-1 + 172PerfSRit_J + 173PerfROAit_l + 174MktBkit_l + 17sRiskit_l + 176Complexsubit_l + 
'11 Complexsubfor + 11 CurrPerfSR + '11 CurrPerfROA + E
',7 tI-J ',8 ',9II TII 
Where: 
TotalCompit = natural log of total compensation awarded 
to the CEO in the year, using lagged bonuses 
and valuing option grants using Black-Scholes 
Other variables = as per Table 2 above. 

























TABLE 4 SUMMARY OF THE OLS REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
FOR THE RELATION BETWEEN TOTAL COMPENSATION AND 
UNDERLYING FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
The coefficients are based on the following equation: 
TotalComPlf = 170 + 17ISizelf_1 + 172PerfSR H-I + 173PerfROA if-I + 174MktBkH_I + 175 
Riskil_1 + 17aComplexsub If-I + 171ComplexSUbfOr if-I + 17aCurrPertSR I + 17gCurrPerfROA I 
+ cl. The tstatistics are reported in brackets. 
, . 
N=672 

















Complexsub I-I + 








Adjusted Ff' 0.415 
Fratio 48.146** 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) * significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Where: 
TotalCompit Log of total compensation using lagged bonuses and 
valuing options using Black-Scholes 
Size l_ Log of the market value of equity1 
PertSR f-I Prior year share return 
PerfROA I-I Prior year Return on Assets (ROA) 
MktBk I-I Market-to-book ratio 
Risk I-x Standard deviation of ROA over prior 3 years 
ComplexSUb f-I Log of number of subsidiaries 
Complexsubfor f- I Log of number of foreign subsidiaries 
CurrPertSRf Current year share return 





IC Overall, the regression model shows that 41.5% of the total 
:3i: os level of CEO compensation can be explained by firm 
: os economic characteristics. Specifically, the model shows that 
::J size, complexity and current market performance are positive 
: ~ and significant as determinants of the level of total CEO 
~1l compensation. The size and complexity results indicate that, 
: ~ consistent with theory, larger and more complex firms 
.~~ require higher quality CEOs and consequently pay higher 
~~ ~ wages to them. The results imply that for a 10% increase in 
'os firm size (measured as market value of equity), CEO 
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compensation is forecast to increase by 3.08%, while for a 
10% increase in total subsidiaries or total foreign subsidiaries, 
CEO compensation is forecast to increase by 3.82% and 
0.26% respectively. 
The regression model also indicates that on average, higher 
compensation is associated with better market performance. 
However, the economic significance of this finding is very 
small, as the result implies that for a 10% increase (or 
decrease) in the market performance of the firm10, CEO 
compensation is expected to increase (decrease) by only 
0.571% (which is around $5,366 for the average CEO 
compensation in this sample). 
This study proVides detailed Australian evidence on the 
relation between firm characteristics and the level of 
compensation awarded to the CEO. Overall, these results 
could suggest that on average, the levels of CEO 
compensation observed in Australia are not randomly 
decided, but are rather related to the various underlying 
economic characteristics of the firm predicted to drive levels 
of CEO compensation. 
However, this study predicted only 41.5 % of total CEO 
compensation. Further investigation could be made into 
other possible determinants of CEO compensation, such as 
the international market for CEOs' services, the presence of 
CEO specialist skills or education and CEOs' preferences, 
which have not been investigated here. Further investigation 
could also be made into the relation between firm 
performance and CEO compensation. However, despite these 
limitations, this paper provides important initial evidence on 
the way in which the level of CEO compensation is 
determined in Australia. 
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Notes 
1 The Australian Financial Review, 10 February 2004, article 10, 
page 54. 
2 Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific 
3 The theory is discussed further in section 2. 
4 In addition, transactions costs reduce the opportunities for 
firms to continuously re-contract until an optimal solution is 
found. Core, Guay and Larcker (2003) state that one main 
difference between the efficient and inefficient contracting 
views are in the treatment of the transactions costs required 
to correct sub-optimal contracts. They argue that an implicit 
assumption of inefficient contracting is that the transactions 
costs are so great that firms cannot re-contract when 
inefficiencies arise, while efficient contracting assumes that 
there are no transactions costs at all, and that firms can 
continuously re-contract Ifor example, see Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985)1· 
5 As listed on Connect 4 (an electronic financial statement 
database of the lop 500 Australian firms). Firms that drop out 
or join the Top 500 during the sample period are included in 
the analysis where they pass the sample requirements. 
6 In that the data was not included in the annual report of 
the company, nor could be found in later annual reports, nor 
in information given to the shareholders at the annual 
general meetings. 
7 Due to data deletions, only 121 firms appear in all three 
years. 
8 Many annual reports state that the bonus for the current 
year is paid and reported in the folJowing year. 
9 All outliers are identified using the procedure in SPSS, and 
are winsorised. 
10 That is, a 10% change in the market return (e.g. from 10% 
to 20%). 
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